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This paper shows that tax reforms involving an increase in consumption taxes
and a decrease in income taxes cannot always be designed in a way that protects
the welfare of some chosen class of consumer (e.g., low-income households), even
if the government is indi⁄erent to the welfare e⁄ects on all other consumers. This
is contrary to common intuition and claims by some governments.
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Over the past 20 years or so, there has been a shift in many countries away from in-
come taxation and towards consumption taxation. For example, Canada (in 1991) and
Australia (in 2000) introduced broad-based consumption taxes (the goods and services
tax or GST), with o⁄setting reductions in income tax rates. The main arguments in
favour of these reforms are: (i) the increase in post-tax income will encourage more work
and employment, (ii) by raising the price of consumption relative to investment, savings
and investment will increase, and (iii) tax evasion will be reduced as income earned
in the underground economy (which cannot be taxed) will be taxed indirectly when
it is consumed. Opponents of these reforms argue that the tax burden is shifted from
higher-income to lower-income consumers, because income tax systems are typically pro-
gressive while consumption taxes are not ￿ everyone pays the same rate irrespective of
income. The government￿ s response to this criticism has often been to claim that it can
design the tax changes in a way that protects the real income (welfare) of lower-income
consumers. For example, it may increase the taxes on luxury goods by more than on
necessities, or even exclude certain goods from taxation entirely. The government may
also reduce the income tax rates faced by lower-income consumers by more than those
faced by higher-income consumers.1 Thus given this assumed ￿ exibility, the expectation
is that no matter the chosen class of consumer￿ s preferences and income, the government
can always substitute consumption taxes for income taxes in a manner that does not
adversely a⁄ect that class of consumer, provided it is indi⁄erent to the welfare e⁄ects
on other classes of consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate formally that the government cannot
always design the tax changes to protect the welfare of some chosen class of consumer.
Demand and supply conditions in the economy, along with the requirement that the
government balance its budget, impose a constraint on the number of ways that the
1When Australia introduced the GST in 2000, the initial package proposed by the government
included an across-the-board 10% consumption tax and roughly equal reductions in income tax rates
along the income spectrum. The ￿nal package approved by the Senate exempted ￿basic foods￿from
GST and reduced the income tax cuts slated for the wealthy, the aim being to protect the real incomes
of low-income consumers.
2government can feasibly substitute consumption taxes for income taxes. And it is pos-
sible that all of these ways reduce the welfare of some consumers. We characterise this
possibility in Theorem 1. In Theorem 2, we characterise the opposite possibility, i.e.,
when all feasible ways of substituting consumption taxes for income taxes make some
class of consumer better-o⁄. Finally, in Theorem 3, we characterise when there exist
feasible ways of substituting consumption taxes for income taxes that make some class of
consumer better-o⁄ and, simultaneously, there exist other feasible ways of substituting
consumption taxes for income taxes that make that same class of consumer worse-o⁄. It
follows that it is only under the conditions of Theorem 3 that the government￿ s chosen
design of the tax changes becomes relevant for determining incidence.
Analytically, our methodology draws on the tax reform literature pioneered by Gues-
nerie [1977, 1995].2 The key di⁄erence is that our methodology allows us to characterise
di⁄erential incidence amongst the consumers, while the Guesnerie-style methodology can
only characterise equilibrium-preserving and Pareto-improving reforms, i.e., feasible re-
forms that make all consumers better-o⁄. Put simply, this is because the Guesnerie-style
is to construct a cone from the gradients of the consumers￿indirect utility functions, and
then use a vector corresponding to the equilibrium conditions to determine feasibility.
In order to characterise di⁄erential incidence we do the opposite, in that we construct a
cone using the equilibrium conditions to determine feasibility, and then use the gradients
of the consumers￿indirect utility functions to determine incidence.3
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
which is the general equilibrium commodity tax model of Diamond and Mirrlees [1971]
extended to incorporate nonlinear income taxation. Section 3 presents the results, while
Section 4 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2See also Diewert [1978], Weymark [1979], and for a good textbook treatment Myles [1995]. For
recent applications of the Guesnerie-style tax reform methodology, see Brett [1998] and Murty and
Russell [2005]. Tax reform techniques have also been used recently by Krause [2009] to examine the
La⁄er argument.
3Krause [2007] uses similar techniques to examine the incidence of capital taxation.
32 The Model
There are k ￿ 2 types of consumers in the economy, who are distinguished by their
wage rates and possibly their preferences. Without loss of generality, we assume that
there is a single consumer of each type. As is true in many countries, there is linear
taxation of the consumption goods and nonlinear taxation of labour income. Formally,
we associate a nonlinear income tax schedule with k tax treatments hyi;miik
i=1, where yi
is the pre-tax income and mi is the post-tax income of consumer i. Therefore, yi￿mi is
the income tax paid by consumer i. The consumers have no pro￿t income, as we make
the common simplifying assumption that the government taxes away all pure pro￿t.4
Consumer i chooses her net (of endowment) vector of consumption goods xi 2 Rn







) j qxi ￿ mig (2.1)
where Ui(￿) is consumer i￿ s direct utility function, and yi = wili where wi is consumer
i￿ s wage rate and li is consumer i￿ s labour supply. We assume throughout that 0 <
w1 < w2 < ::: < wk, so that consumer 1 is the lowest-wage type and consumer k is
the highest-wage type. Following the standard practice, we assume that pre-tax income
is observable (and therefore taxable) by the government, but each individual￿ s type
is private information which rules out the use of personalised lump-sum taxes. The
consumer price vector corresponding to the n consumption goods is q = p + t, where p
is the producer price vector and t is a vector of consumption taxes.
The supply side of the economy consists of a single, aggregate, pro￿t-maximising ￿rm.
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is given by ￿(p;w), where w := hw1;w2;:::;wki. Application
of Hotelling￿ s Lemma to the pro￿t function yields the ￿rm￿ s output-supply and input-
4Alternatively, one could assume that the production side of the economy is characterised by constant
returns to scale, which implies zero pro￿ts in equilibrium.
4demand functions:
rp￿(￿) = x(p;w) and rw￿(￿) = ￿l(p;w) (2.2)
where x(￿) is the (net) supply vector of the n consumption goods, and l(￿) is the demand
vector for the k types of labour.


















;mi) ￿ 0 i = 2;:::;k (2.5)
where xi(￿) are the consumers￿demand functions, and Vi(￿) are the consumers￿indirect
utility functions. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are standard market clearing conditions for








wki is the labour supply
by the k consumers. Market clearing ensures that the government￿ s budget is exactly
balanced if all the equations in (2.3) and (2.4) are satis￿ed as equalities, or in surplus
if some of these equations are satis￿ed as strict inequalities.5 The equations in (2.5) are
incentive-compatibility (or self-selection) constraints associated with nonlinear income
taxation. We analyse what Stiglitz [1982] calls the ￿normal￿case and what Guesnerie
[1995] calls ￿redistributive equilibria￿ , in that the incentive-compatibility constraints
may bind ￿downwards￿ but never ￿upwards￿ . This is consistent with redistributive
taxation, which creates an incentive for higher-wage consumers to mimic lower-wage
consumers, but not vice versa. Built into (2.5) is the simplifying assumption that only
downward-adjacent incentive-compatibility constraints may bind.6 Finally, for analytical
purposes we assume that the status quo equilibrium is ￿tight￿ , i.e., the equations in
(2:3)￿(2:5) all hold with equality in the initial equilibrium. This assumption allows us
5This follows from Walras￿Law. See chapter 2 in Guesnerie [1995] for further details.
6This would necessarily be the case if the consumers￿indi⁄erence curves satis￿ed the ￿single-crossing￿
property in (yi;mi) space.
5to di⁄erentiate the system (2:3) ￿ (2:5).
3 Characterising Incidence
Starting in any tight equilibrium, we are interested in determining the incidence of a
small (modelled as di⁄erential) increase in the consumption taxes and decrease in the
income taxes. To this end, de￿ne a reform as the vector dR := hdp, dt, dw, dy, dmi
where y := hy1;y2;:::;yki and m := hm1;m2;:::;mki. The government has direct control
over the consumption taxes t and the income taxes hy;mi, and changes in these taxes
may induce changes in p and w according to the equilibrium conditions. Speci￿cally,
a reform is equilibrium-preserving if and only if rZdR ￿ 0(n+2k￿1), where rZ is the
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5
We are interested in reforms that involve an increase in the consumption taxes and
a decrease in the income taxes. That is, we are interested in reforms that satisfy:
2
40(n￿n) I
(n￿n) 0(n￿k) 0(n￿k) 0(n￿k)






6For convenience, we rewrite this expression as rSdR ￿ 0(n+k).7
Let ￿ ￿ R2n+3k be the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations
of the rows of rZ. The set of equilibrium-preserving reforms is therefore the negative
polar cone of ￿, i.e., ￿P(￿) := fdR 2 R2n+3k j rZdR ￿ 0(n+2k￿1)g. Let ￿ ￿ R2n+3k be
the cone generated by taking non-negative linear combinations of the rows of rS. The
positive polar cone of ￿ is the set of reforms that involve an increase in the consumption
taxes and a decrease in the income taxes, i.e., P(￿) := fdR 2 R2n+3k j rSdR ￿ 0(n+k)g.
It follows that the set of equilibrium-preserving reforms that involve an increase in the
consumption taxes and a decrease in the income taxes is ￿P(￿) \ P(￿) =: E. It
is assumed that E is not empty; otherwise the government cannot feasibly substitute
consumption taxes for income taxes. The intuitive interpretation of E is that it repre-
sents the ￿degrees of freedom￿the government has in substituting consumption taxes
for income taxes. If E is ￿small￿in size, the government has little ￿ exibility in how
it substitutes consumption taxes for income taxes. On the other hand, if E is ￿large￿
the government has greater ￿ exibility. For future reference, we denote the positive polar
cone of E by P(E) and the negative polar cone of E by ￿P(E).
A reform makes consumer i better-o⁄ if and only if dVi(￿) = rVidR > 0, where
rVi is the gradient of consumer i￿ s indirect utility function (with respect to dR) and is
de￿ned as rVi := hrqVi; rqVi; rwVi; ryVi; rmVii. Similarly, a reform makes consumer
i worse-o⁄ if and only if dVi(￿) = rVidR < 0. We can now state the following theorems
(proofs are in the appendix).
Theorem 1 Substituting consumption taxes for income taxes necessarily makes con-
sumer i worse-o⁄ if and only if rVi 2 ￿P(E). Moreover, rVi 2 ￿P(E) if and only if
there exist real numbers h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ 0(n), h￿1;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k), h￿2;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k￿1), ￿ ￿ 0,
and h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿ki > 0(n+k) such that:
￿rVi + h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿kirS = h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿k;￿2;:::;￿kirZ
where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.
7Vector notation: z ￿ z () zj ￿ zj 8 j, z > z () zj ￿ zj 8 j ^ z 6= z, z ￿ z () zj > zj 8 j.
7Theorem 2 Substituting consumption taxes for income taxes necessarily makes con-
sumer i better-o⁄ if and only if rVi 2 P(E). Moreover, rVi 2 P(E) if and only if there
exist real numbers h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ 0(n), h￿1;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k), h￿2;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k￿1), ￿ ￿ 0, and
h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿ki > 0(n+k) such that:
￿￿rVi + h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿kirS = h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿k;￿2;:::;￿kirZ
where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.
Theorems 1 and 2 formalise the intuition that there are only a limited number of
ways in which the government can feasibly substitute consumption taxes for income
taxes, and it is possible that all of these ways make some consumers worse-o⁄(Theorem
1) and other consumers better-o⁄ (Theorem 2). In particular, Theorem 1 implies that
the government cannot always design the tax changes in a way that protects the welfare
of some chosen class of consumer.
The sets in Theorems 1 and 2 do not, generally, form a partition of R2n+3k. Theorem
3 addresses the possibility that rVi = 2 ￿P(E) and rVi = 2 P(E).
Theorem 3 There exists a feasible way of substituting consumption taxes for income
taxes that makes consumer i better-o⁄ and, simultaneously, there exists another feasible
way of substituting consumption taxes for income taxes that makes consumer i worse-o⁄,
if and only if rVi = 2 ￿P(E) and rVi = 2 P(E). Moreover, rVi = 2 ￿P(E) and rVi = 2
P(E) if and only if there do not exist real numbers h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ 0(n), h￿1;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k),
h￿2;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k￿1), ￿ ￿ 0, and h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿ki > 0(n+k) such that:
￿rVi + h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿kirS = h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿k;￿2;:::;￿kirZ
and there do not exist real numbers h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ 0(n), h￿1;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k), h￿2;:::;￿ki ￿
0(k￿1), ￿ ￿ 0, and h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿ki > 0(n+k) such that:
￿￿rVi + h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿kirS = h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿k;￿2;:::;￿kirZ
where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.
8In summary, it is only under the conditions of Theorem 3 that the manner in which
the government substitutes consumption taxes for income taxes becomes relevant for
determining consumer i￿ s incidence.
The geometry of Theorems 1 and 2 is illustrated in Figure 1, albeit in a stylised two-
dimensional manner. Equilibrium requires that dR 2 E, where the size of E represents
the ￿degrees of freedom￿or ￿number of ways￿in which the government can feasibly
substitute consumption taxes for income taxes. Since rVi 2 P(E) and rVj 2 ￿P(E), it
follows that dR must form an acute angle with rVi (meaning rVidR > 0) and an obtuse
angle with rVj (meaning rVjdR < 0). Therefore, substituting consumption taxes for
income taxes necessarily makes consumer i better-o⁄and consumer j worse-o⁄. Figure 2
illustrates the geometry of Theorem 3. If the government substitutes consumption taxes
for income taxes in a manner corresponding to dR, consumer i is made better-o⁄ since
dR and rVi form an acute angle. However, substituting consumption taxes for income
taxes in a manner corresponding to dR makes consumer i worse-o⁄, since dR and rVi
form an obtuse angle.
4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated formally that tax reforms involving an increase in con-
sumption taxes and a decrease in income taxes cannot always be designed in a way that
protects the welfare of some chosen class of consumer. Demand and supply conditions
in the economy, along with the requirement that the government balance its budget,
limit the number of ways in which the government can substitute consumption taxes for
income taxes. And it is possible that all of these ways make some consumers worse-o⁄.
5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is based on an analysis of the geometry of the problem. Feasibility requires
that dR 2 E. Note that ￿P(E) = f￿ 2 R2n+3k j ￿dR < 0 8 dR 2 Eg. Therefore,
9rVi 2 ￿P(E) =) rVidR < 0 8 dR 2 E. And if there does not exist a dR 2 E such
that rVidR ￿ 0, then rVi 2 ￿P(E). Using Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative,8
there does not exist a reform dR such that:
rZdR ￿ 0
(n+2k￿1) rVidR ￿ 0 rSdR ￿ 0
(n+k)
if and only if there exist real numbers h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ 0(n), h￿1;:::;￿ki ￿ 0(k), h￿2;:::;￿ki ￿
0(k￿1), ￿ ￿ 0, and h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿ki > 0(n+k) such that:
￿rVi + h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿kirS = h￿1;:::;￿n;￿1;:::;￿k;￿2;:::;￿kirZ
as stated in the theorem. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2
Analogous to that of Theorem 1. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3
Follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2. ￿
8See chapter 2 in Mangasarian [1969] for a statement and proof of Motzkin￿ s Theorem.
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